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the housing act was to provide safe and sanitary housing to persons of
low income. 50 The Tyler Court of Civil Appeals, in Crowell, interpreted the same statute which created the public housing authority
and stated "[t]he basic rule of construction of statutes is that the courts
must take statutes as they find them." 51 Agreeing with this rule, can
the court in Crowell justify the strict construction of section 8(a), which
also gives the housing authority the power "[t]o sue and be sued" to
possibly manifest an intention by the Texas Legislature to allow the
public housing authority to contract in an exculpatory manner? 52 On
the contrary, there is no section within article 1269k which expressly
grants the housing authority the right to use an exculpatory clause in
a lease agreement with its tenants. The housing authority is granted
the right to contract under section 8(a), however, this right is limited
to contracts which are "necessary or convenient to the exercise of the
powers of the authority. . .. 53 The purpose of the exercise of the
authority's power is to provide safe and sanitary housing for low
income families.5 4 This power should have been limited in Crowell to
that which would fulfill the purpose of the housing act and should not
have been expanded in a manner which defeats such a purpose by
allowing an unlimited freedom of contract against a duty imposed
by law.
Charles Michael Montgomery
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Brown v. Poritzky, 332 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1972).
Plaintiff Brown sold his insurance business to defendant Poritzky
with the understanding that defendant was to insure certain of plaintiff's properties against loss by fire. Poritzky negligently failed to insure
one such property which was subsequently destroyed by fire. Brown
sued for damages occasioned by the loss, and Poritzky set up as his
defense the contributory negligence of Brown's general agent who had
negligently failed to conduct a follow-up on the status of the fire in50 Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 164, 143 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940).
51 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ

granted).
52 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k, § 8(a) (1963). It should be noted that section
8(d) also gives the public housing authority the authority to obtain insurance "against
any risks or hazards" incident to its operation. Id. § 8(d).
53
54

Id.

Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 164, 143 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940).
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surance coverage undertaken by the defendant. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Held-Affirmed. In an
action for damages by a principal against his negligent special agent,
the concurrent negligence of the principal's general agent is not imputed to the principal so as to bar recovery.'
Basic to the law of agency is the theory that a principal is vicariously
liable to third persons for the negligent acts of his agent committed
in the course of employment. 2 However, this is not meant to say that
an agent is relieved from liability in such a case, for he is always personally liable for his own negligence, 3 and may be liable to his principal
in the case where the principal has been held accountable for the agent's
tortious acts. 4 The negligent agent in such a situation may assert the
defense of the principal's personal contributory negligence where provable,6 but he cannot impute his own negligence to his principal so as
to bar recovery.6 Such an attempt by an agent to escape liability for
his own wrongful conduct has been termed "a perversion of the idea
7
of imputed negligence."
The rule that the negligence of an agent is imputed to his principal
in a suit between the principal and a third person, but not in an action
by the principal against the negligent agent, is firmly based upon two
sound policy considerations: First, a wrongdoer may not attribute his
own wrongdoing to the victim so as to avoid liability for negligence;8
and secondly, an agent's liability to his principal rests on the violation
of the agent's personal duty of reasonable care and skill owed to the
principal. 9
Against this background of universally recognized agency rules
emerges the question presented by the situation in Brown v. Poritzky:10
Do the laws of imputed contributory negligence leave the master of
two concurrently negligent agents without a remedy?
Of the very few cases in which the question has ever been considered,
Zulkee v. Wing" makes the most definitive statement on the issue. In
Zulkee, an employee sought to recover for services rendered in cutting
I Brown v. Poritzky, 332 N.Y.S.2d 872, 877 (1972).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957); see, e.g., Sandrock v. Taylor, 174
N.W.2d 186, 192 (Neb. 1970).
53RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 (1957); see, e.g., Male v. Acme Markets, Inc.,
264 A.2d 245, 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970).
4 Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625, 627 (Utah 1972); cf. Note, 4 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 227 (1972).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 415 (1957); see, e.g., Riddle-Duckworth, Inc. v.

Sullivan, 171 S.E.2d 486, 491 (S.C. 1969).
6 Alderman v. Noble, 4 N.E.2d 619, 620 (Mass. 1936).
7Id. at 620.
8Id. at 620.
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1957); see, e.g., State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury, 494 P.2d 529 (Utah 1972).
10 332 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1972).
1120 Wis. 408 (1866).
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logs. The defendant employer counterclaimed for damages caused by
the plaintiff's negligent cutting of a tree which fell upon and killed
his master's horses. The employee contended that the concurrent negligence of a co-worker, in failing to remove the horses from the danger
area as warned, was imputed to their employer under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, thus rendering him contributorily negligent and
barring the counterclaim.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this theory, stating that the
doctrine of imputed contributory negligence had no application as between the master and servant, but only as between the master and third
persons. 12 The court stated the policy basis for the holding in these
words:
To apply the maxim in such a case would be an utter perversion
of it, and destructive of all liability on the part of servants. The
servant in such a case represents, not the master, but himself. It is
his own negligence and misconduct for which he is required to
answer; and in this respect he stands upon the same footing as any
other wrongdoer.' 3
Zulkee has been cited as authority in support of holdings and dicta
in various jurisdictions on the few occasions on which the issue has
ever been decided. 14 However, in Capitola v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.
Ste. M.R.R.,15 the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the
Zulkee holding. The case involved an action brought under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act' 6 for damages sustained by a railroad fireman
in a head-on collision between two of the defendant's locomotives. The
defendant railroad company counterclaimed for the damage to its property, asserting that the plaintiff's negligence had contributed to the
injury. The court refused the counterclaim and approved the plaintiff's
contention that the concurrent negligence of two of the defendant's
engineers was imputed to the defendant, rendering it contributorily
negligent:
[Zulkee v. Wing] was decided long ago and in another jurisdiction.
It is neither controlling nor persuasive here and now. We decline
to follow it. We hold that in an action by an employer against his
employee for damages resulting from the negligence of the employee, contributory negligence is a defense and may be established
12 Id. at 410.
13 Id. at 410.
14 E.g., Buhl v. Viera, 102 N.E.2d 774 (Mass. 1952); Patterson v. Brater, 196 N.W. 202

(Mich. 1923); Raney v. La Chance, 70 S.W. 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902); cf. Alderman v.
Noble, 4 N.E.2d 619, 620 (Mass. 1936).
15 103 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1960).
16 Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
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by attributing to the employer the negligence of a coemployee
7
which is a proximate cause of the damage.1
The second and, to date, only other case to reject the Zulkee rationale is that of Insurance Co. of North America v. Anderson,8 in
which the Idaho Supreme Court embraced the Capitola holding in its
refusal to allow recovery by an employer's subrogee in an action against
a negligent employee, where it was shown that another employee had
contributed to the injury to the employer's property through his negligent supervision of the defendant employee.
These represent the total of the cases dealing with the issue discussed
herein. However, the court in the instant case had no difficulty in adopt9 nor did
ing Zulkee and in expressly rejecting Capitola;1
it attempt to
distinguish the two cases on any basis. Rather, the court expressed in
the form of a policy statement its concern that the doctrine of imputed
contributory negligence should not be allowed to deny a remedy to an
employer injured by two negligent agents. "[A] special agent who
breaches a duty owed to his principal should not be insulated from
liability by the fortuitous happenstance of a general agent's concurrent
negligence.

' 20

The court found that Poritzky was Brown's special agent by virtue
of the fact that Poritzky, as a condition of the sale of Brown's insurance
business, was to be the exclusive insurance broker for Brown's properties. Arkawy, Brown's son-in-law, was appointed his agent in general
charge of Brown's properties during an extended absence for health
reasons. Among Arkawy's duties was the ascertaining of the extent of
insurance coverage of the properties. Poritzky did not obtain coverage
due to an administrative error, and Arkawy failed to learn of this omission by the defendant. Consequently, the building destroyed by fire
2
was not covered by the requested insurance protection. '
The defendant attempted to distinguish Zulkee on the basis that the
two negligent agents in that case were co-equals, while the situation in
Brown involved the concurrent negligence of a special agent and the
plaintiff's general agent.22 A special agent is regarded as one employed

for a specific purpose and who acts under limited powers, 23 while a
general agent is one engaged to generally conduct all of the various
17 Capitola v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R., 103 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Minn. 1960).

18 438 P.2d 265 (Idaho 1968).
19 Brown v. Poritzky, 332 N.Y.S.2d 872, 876 (1972).
20 Id. at 877.
21 Id. at 874.
22 Brief for Appellant at 15, Brown v. Poritzky, 332 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1972).
23 Skutt v. Goodwin, 295 N.Y.S. 772, 777 (Sup. Ct. 1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 3(2) (1957).
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aspects of the business of his principal. 24 The importance of the distinction relates to the extent of authority of each agent to do certain
acts in the name of the principal, 25 rather than to differing standards
of care owing to the master. 26 In the instant case, the court did not
concern itself with the distinction other than to say that the defendant,
as a special agent, " 'was obliged to exercise reasonable diligence to
protect the interests of plaintiffs by insurance.' "27
It can be argued that Zulkee and Capitola are distinguishable on the
basis of the nature of the employer in each case. In Zulkee, the employer
was an individual, while in Capitola, the employer was a corporation.
In the case where the employer is a corporation, Capitola may be the
desirable approach, for a corporation can act only through its agents,
and a defendant employee would not be able to assert successfully the
defense of contributory negligence under the Zulkee rationale. But
the court in Capitola, ignored this important distinction and would
have all employees behave negligently with impunity, without regard
to the nature of their employers under the sweeping application of its
holding.
The Zulkee doctrine finds additional support from the rules governing joint enterprises, an area of the law to which the doctrine of
vicarious liability also applies. Each member of a joint enterprise is
both the principal and the agent of the other members. 2 Accordingly,
each may subject the others to liability to third persons injured by his
negligent conduct while pursuing the objectives of the venture.29 However, the courts have held that the doctrine of imputed negligence as a
defense is available only to third persons and not to members of the
joint enterprise in an action among themselves. Thus a negligent
member of a joint enterprise may not set up the negligence of himself
or of another member as a bar to an action against him by a third
member of the joint enterprise. Here again the reluctance of the court
to allow an' individual to pass his negligence along to another is
evidenced.
It is obvious that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
24 Arkansas Medical & Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Cragar, 249 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Ark. 1952);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3(1) (1957).
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3

(1957); F.

MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW

OF AGENCY § 17 (4th rev. ed. 1952).

379(1) (1957).
27 Brown v. Poritzky, 332 N.Y.S.2d 872, 876 (1972), citing MacDonald v. Carpenter &
Pelton, 298 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
28 Accord, e.g., Mercer v. Vinson, 336 P.2d 854, 858 (Ariz. 1959).
29 Accord, e.g., Mayer v. Sampson, 402 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1965).
30 E.g., Gilreath v. Silverman, 95 S.E.2d 107, 109 (N.C. 1956), quoting Rollison v. Hicks,
63 S.E.2d 190, 195 (N.C. 1951); Williamson Motor Co. v. Smith, 274 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, no writ); 58 AM. Jtn. 2d Negligence § 466 (1971).
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
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